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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
-vs-

Case No. 19149

RICHARD I. CINTRON,
Defendant-Appellant,

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
Appellant was convicted of the charge of Aggravated Robbery and
Aggravated Burglary felonies of the first degree in the District Court
for the Third Judicial District, in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah,
the Honorable James S. Sawaya, Judge presiding.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
Appellant was sentenced to the Utah State Prison for a term
as provided by law of not less than five (5) but which may be for life
after a jury found him guilty of both offenses.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant seeks reversal of the judgment rendered, or in the
alternative a new trial.

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
The appellant, herein, with Joseph James Price, was accused of

burglarizing and robbing William E. Parker at his residence at 11760 South
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State Street, Salt Lake County, State of Utah, on the

of July,

1982.

It was alleged that the defendants, in the early morning hours of that
day, broke into Mr. Parker's residence, blindfolded and held him at knife
point while they ransacked the house taking various items of property.
(T. Vol I pg 12)
Appellant was identified as the result of having prior contact
with the victim who was able to identify him from a photographic lineup
conducted by the Salt Lake County Sheriff's Office.
allegedly stolen was recovered,

None of the property

identified or connected with the appellant.

(T. Vol I pg 44)
At the trial of the matter,

the State of Utah presented the

evidence of Mr. Parker's identification.

Appellant produced two witnesses

whose testimony attempted to establish an alibi for the date and time of the
offense.

In rebuttal to that testimony and over objection, (T. Vol I pg 169)

the State of Utah produced Detective Dick Forbes, Salt Lake County Sheriff's
Office, regarding such witnesses (T. Vol I pg 171).

Appellant had duly

filed a Notice of Alibi but had not received any Notice regarding the testimony
of Forbes.
Appellant testified in his own behalf (T. Vol I pg 141).

During

the course of cross-examination, the Deputy County Attorney inquired, over
objection, whether he had been convicted of a misdemeanor (T. Vol I pg 152).
Appellant responded that he had been convicted of a misdemeanor theft in a
Salt Lake County Justice of the Peace Court subsequent to the date of this
alleged offense.
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Co-defendant, Joseph James Price, was represented by Jo Carol
Nessett-Sale.

During the course of closing argument Ms. Nessett-Sale

argued that it was her opinion that appellant Richard I. Cintron had
corrunitted the crime and that one of the alibi
matched the description of the co-perpetrator.

witnesses, James McCall,
Such arguments were made

over ejection. (T. Vol II pg 34-37 and 38)
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE EVIDENCE INTRODUCED AT TRIAL WAS INSUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT A VERDICT.
The evidence at trial consisted of the identification by the
victim Parker.

He testified that in the early morning hours he was awakend

by his dog and went to the back door (T. Vol I pg 14).
kitchen and porch light.

He turned on the

Looking through some sheers covering the window

in his back door he observed a person on the porch.

Opening the door

slightly he inquired as to the purpose for that person knocking and yelling.
The door was then shoved open knocking Mr. Parker on his back.

A person

identified as Joseph James Price then went through the door and threatend
the victim with a knife which was placed at his throat.
folded and transported to a different

He was then blind-

room where he was held while the

perpetrators of the offense ransacked his house. (T. Vol I pg 18)
Mr. Parker testified that he had observed Joseph James Price
as the result of the incident with the knife aided by the lighting in the
kitchen (1. Vol 1 pg 19-20).

He further testified that he observed the

appPllant, herein, as the result of observing him briefly through the sheers
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aided by the light from the kitchen and purch
that he was not wearing his glasses (1. Voll pg JY).

Furthc-r, Lt was

established that the lighting on the porch was behind the person who was
at the back door (T. Vol l pg 37).

Mr. Parker testified that he had observed

the appellant on three prior occasions when appellant had come to his house
with a request to purchase some gasoline and

(T. Vol l pg 15).

on

subsequent occasions to talk

These prior occurrences were brief and without incident.

During the course of the robbery Mr. Parker testified that he
heard the "blond man" identified as Price, call the other man "Gary".

(T. Vol l pg 23)

He also testified that he heard the term "Rich" used.

Although Mr. Parker was clear that the name "Gary" referred to the other
man, circumstances were such that it was unclear whether the word "Rich"

was used as a name.

That confusion was apparent because the victim did

not hear how the term was used in the conversation.

It was spoken as a

whisper and after Mr. Parker had been tied, gagged and bleeding for some period
of time. (T. Vol l pg 48-50)
ln defense, appellant presented two witnesses, Sidney Hatcher
(T. Vol l pg 125) and Jarues

(T. Vol l pg 153).

They testified that,

at the time and date of the offense, they were with appellant at the residence
of Sidney Hatcher.

All three men had been drinking heavily through the day

and in the early morning hours had gone tu sleep in the Hat'-' her camper.
It is proper that this Court rt.'View the evidt:nce submitt'2J ln

the trial to determine wl1ether it W3S sufficient t0 su11p0rt a
guilty.

It is difficult for revie\..'lng Cvurts

has, having heard the evidence, founJ

0f

to ::;e(unU 5\1.._·ss a Jury which

guilty

could come to an opposite conclusion from the jury.

This Court's review

of the evidence is different because it is a review from a transcript
with sufficient time to examine and compare the evidence and testimony.
1his Court is also able to more meticulously apply the legal standards of

proof and presumptions in its review of the evidence.
States, 338 U.S. 160:

Brinegar v. United

"If the evidence with respect to any defense ... is

sufficient to raise a reasonable doubt as to the defendant's guilt, he
should be acquitted".

State v. Wilson, 565 P.2d 66 (Ut 1977): "It must

appear that upon so reviewing the evidence, reasonable minds must necessarily
entertain a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed a
State v. Mills, 530 P.2d 1272 (Ut 1975):

"For defendant to prevail upon

a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain his conviction,
it must appear that viewing the evidence and all inferences that may reasonably
be drawn therefrom, in the light most favorable to the verdict of the jury,
reasonable minds could not believe him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt."
at page 1272.

The State 1 s evidence rested solely on Parker's identification.
There was no other evidence linking appellant to the crime.

fingerprints or other physical evidence.
observed any part of the incident.

1here were no

There were no other witnesses who

No stolen property was recovered or con-

nected to appellant.

Parker's identification was fraught with reasonable doubt because
of the circumstances of the viewing.

Parker had been sleeping,

and had a brief

view of appellant prior to being assaulted by the person identified as
Joseph James Price.

The lighting was such that no clear view of the defendant
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could have been made.

Parker was looking through sheers over his back window.

The lighting on the porch was behind the person and Mr. Parker did not
have his glasses on.

The man was referred to as '1 Gary 11 with confusion as

to whether he had also been called "Rich".

Combine those circumstances with the testimony of two witnesses
who established appellant's presence in another location and it must be
concluded that there was reasonable doubt and reasonable minds should have
had that reasonable doubt.
POINT II
IT WAS ERROR FOR THE PROSECUTOR TO INQUIRE OF THE DEFENDANT'S PRIOR
MISDEMEANOR CONVICTION.
The question here ivolves the perameters whereby the
prosecuting attorney may inquire of a defendant, who is testifying, regarding

prior convictions of misdemeanors.
The State of Utah relies on Rule 21, Utah Rules of Evidence,
for the proposition that the testifying defendant may be asked regarding
convictions for crimes involving dishonesty and false statement even if they

are misdemeanors.

Appellant, herein, had been convicted of a misdemeanor

theft in a Justice of the Peace Court in Salt Lake County.

He had entered

a plea to such offense subsequent to his arrest for aggravated robbery and
burglary which were the subject matter of the trial.

The prosecutor maintained

that a theft conviction involved dishonesty as defined by the rule.
78-24-9, Utah Code Annotated

as amended), allows the prosecutor

to ask regarding the defendant's prior record only to the extent of a felony

conviction.

The statute provides:
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''A witness must answer questions legal and pertinent to the
matter in issue, although his answer may establish a claim
against himself; but he need not give an answer which will
have a tendency to subject him to punishment for a felony;
nor need he give an answer which will have a direct tendency
to degrade his character, unless it is to the very fact in
issue or to a fact from which the fact in issue would be
presumed.
But a witness must answer as to the fact of his
previous conviction a felony.
In State v. Bennett, 517 P.2d 1029 (Ut 1973), the defendant was
required to answer to a prior conviction of a felony and to tell the jury

that the conviction was for a second degree murder.

The issue in that case

was whether the State properly asked as to the particulars of the felony

conviction.

This Court concluded:
"Rule 21 by its terms does not apply where a statute otherwise
applies; and since the statute does otherwise provide, there
was no error in requiring the defendant to answer to his
prior conviction of murder in the second degree."
1031.
In most of the decisions decided by the Utah Supreme Court in

this regard, the issues have involved the extent to which the prosecutor
may inquire into a felony conviction.

The arguments have revolved around

questions by the prosecutor regarding the circumstances of the crime committed
or the plea entered on a felony conviction.

It would seem however, that the

rule that one may not inquire into a conviction other than felony is established.
Refer State v. Kazda, 382 P.2d 402 (Ut 1963), State v. Dickson, 361 P.2d
412 (Ut 1961), State v. Roberts, 612 P.2d 360 (Ut 1980), State v. Mccumber,
622 P.2d 353 (Ut 1980).
Appellant would urge this Court to conclude that where the statute,
in this case, 78-24-9, restricts the inquiry of the prosecutor to felony

convictions, no rule of evidence can expand the examination to include a
misdemeanor.
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The language of Rule 21 does not

L'XpauJ

tht> st.:.itutory restriction

but may be interpreted as adding a further limitation to

statute.

That is to say that Rule 21 is more restrictive than the statute.

Rule 21

provides:
"Evidence of the conviction of a witness for a crime nut
involving dishonesty or false statement shall be inadmissible for the purpose of impairing his credibility except
as otherwise provided by statute."
As the rule is in the negative it should be interpreted as not
only restricting inquiry of prior convictions to felonies but requiring
that those felonies involve false statement or dishonesty.

Rather than

expanding the rule as argued by the State to include felonies and crimes
of dishonesty and false statement, it restricts the types of felonies
about which the prosecutor may ask.
Therefore, under either approach the prosecutor should not have
been permitted to ask about the misdemeanor conviction.

Either the Rule of

Evidence is precluded by statute from being interpreted as allowing such
a line of questioning or the Rule of Evidence is more narrow and restrictive

in relation to the statute and only provides for questions about convictions
of felonies involving dishonesty or false statement.
The prejudice of such an inquiry is evident.

Where the case

involves an eyewitness and a defendant's denial, the credibility uf the
witness in making the denial is essential.

Any evidenc2 whicl1 is elicted

from the witness tending to detract from tlis credibility
of his testimony.

If that

goes

is improperly

subject matters not allowed by the

ar1J

the extreme.
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or

it is

to

heart
into
to

POINT Ill
TilAT IT WAS
FOR CO-COUNSEL, IN CLOSING ARGUMENT, TO ARGUE HER OPINION
REGARD ING APPELLANT'S GUILT.
In closing argument, Jo Carol Nessett-Sale, attorney for codefendant, Joseph James Price, over objection, commented upon the States

case against defendant Cintron and his relation to a witness, James McCall,
who testified as an alibi witness for appellant.

It was Ms. Nessett-Sale's

line of argument that the State had established, through strong evidence,
that Cintron had indeed committed the offense.

McCall matched closely

the description of the co-perpetrator; that is young, blonde with receeding
hairline.

It was Ms. Nessett-Sale's approach that the evidence against

Cintron was strong and consequently, if we believed McCall, that he was
with Cintron, it would necessarily follow that McCall was the co-perpetrator
of the offense.

Counsel, in essence, not only gave her opinion regarding

the evidence, but indicated that she knew things which the jury was not privy
to and consequently set herself up as offering an opinion based on personal
knowledge.
"Then we have the issue of the co-defendant here.
You know and
the judge has indicated that these men are to be treated
separately and certainly my job is to defend and my privilege is
to defend Joe Price.
It is not to prosecute anyone else.
But
we can't help but observe that if one of the two men here today
charged with this crime is a robber, you know who it is and it
is not JoePrice."(T. Vol 2 pg 34-35)
"When I heard Dick Forbes, from the Prosecutor's Office,
that according to his conversation with Mr. Hatcher, the
landlord, the last time he saw Richard Cintron was at
3:00 a.m. in the morning when he left he and Mr. McCall out in
the camper drinking and when Mr. McCall walked in, I about
dropped.
I know that you noticed that he was a blonde man with
a mustache who could be my client's brother.
I looked at him, a
man I had never seen before, and I thought, 11 My god, I wish
Mr. Parker \.Jere here.
I wish he could see this man." Because
if Mr. Cintron was with Mr. Hatcher and Mr. McCall all that night

moving and was with him the next morning at 9:00 a.m. and
were drinking in the camper until 3: 00 in the rnorn1ng,
then who is the likely blonde who was with Mr. Cintron
if Mr. Cintron was the man who did the robbery? Who? Is
Mr. McCall brazen enough to walk into this Court and to
provide an alibi for his robber companion? Well, we have
never said that crooks were very bright." (T. Vol 2, pg 35-36)
In Workman v. Henrie, 266 P. 1033 (Ut 1928), there were comments
by counsel that he had personal knowledge of the credibility of certain
witnesses and the believeability of their version of the circumstances.
In that case, however, it was determined not to be error because the court

instructed the jury to disregard such a line of argument as counsel had not
been called as a witness and had not testified.

The court inquired of opposing

counsel whether anything else could be done to correct the situation.

Opposing

counsel offered no further argument or suggestion regarding instruction
or procedures in which the Court could engage to correct the situation
In this present situation there
making exactly the same type of comments.

lS

a similiarity to a prosecutor

This

lS

not a case in which co-

defendant Price, having knowledge that the offense was committed by Cintron
offered that testimony and maintained his innocence.

Rather, Price maintained

that he knew nothing of the offense and it was his counsel, in closing arguments,
which alluded to the guilt of appellant and attempted to offer her own opinion
regarding how the offense was committed suggesting the co-perpetrator was the
alibi witness.
Except for the standard instruction that argument of counsel was
not evidence the Court made no attempt to correct the situation.
permitted to continue this line of argument and observation.
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Counsel was

CONCLUSION
Appellant urges this Court to the conclusion that the evidence at

trial was insufficient because there was no evidence corroborating the victim
Parker's identification which was fraught with circumstances leading to reasonable doubt.

The prosecutor's case was further weakend by the presentation

of alibi witness' in defense of appellant.
The Utah Rules and statutes do not provide for inquiry into con-

victions of misdemeanors and consequently the prosecutor's question regarding
appellant's conviction of misdemeanor theft was improper.

Such an error

was prejudicial because it went to the heart of the defendant's case in
challenging his credibility.

Co-Counsel's closing argument was improper because it set her up
as offering an opinion regarding appellant's guilt and inferred knowledge of
which the jury was not aware without being called as a
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this
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(y

day of

and testifying.

1983.
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